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Playing Both Sides: Belarus between 
Russia and the EU
by Alex Nice
This paper takes Belarus as a case study to consider patterns of  cooperation and 
conflict between Russia and the EU in the “common neighbourhood.” It exam-
ines the ways that Belarus under Alexander Lukashenko has exploited competition 
between the EU and Russia to extract subsidies which have helped to sustain the 
regime.
The paper begins by examining why Belarus’s relations with Russia have become 
characterized by cycles of  conflict and engagement. Integration with Belarus 
represents an important part of  Russia’s efforts to maintain regional hegemony. 
On the other hand, the relationship is also perceived as a burden which provides 
resources for the Belarusian regime’s survival with little benefit to Moscow. The 
contradictions of  this approach have been further sharpened by the Customs 
Union.
It is argued that Belarus has provoked further conflict with Russia by adopting an 
increasingly instrumental approach to integration. The assertion of  loyalty or inde-
pendence can be seen as a form of  “sovereignty entrepreneurship,” which recalls 
the ethnic bargaining of  Russia’s regions in the 1990s. When Russia has sought 
to reduce subsidies, Belarus has responded by threatening to diversify its foreign 
policy and seeks other partners. 
However, the inconsistencies of  Lukashenko’s foreign policy mask a deeper con-
tinuity—the consolidation of  Belarusian statehood and identity as an independent 
state. The dilemma for the EU—which has an interest in promoting Belarusian 
sovereignty—is that this has been conducted within the context of  an authoritar-
ian system.
Both the EU and Russia are seeking to shape Belarus’s domestic normative envi-
ronment. The implication of  EU policy is that Belarus needs to discover (or 
recover) its European identity, which has been suppressed by its Soviet heritage 
and the current regime. The rational for integration with Russia is a common his-
tory and cultural affinities as part of  a single Slavic civilizational space. 
Behind these competing approaches is an implied struggle for Belarusian identity 
which, because it is cast in terms of  geopolitical choice, is liable to lead to polariza-
tion between Russia and the EU. In the long term, the consolidation of  Belarusian 
statehood is likely to lead to further differentiation from Russia. However, the 
failure of  the nationalist opposition to harness falling support for Lukashenko’s 
regime suggests that a change of  government will not necessarily lead to the 
immediate “Europeanization” of  Belarus. This suggests that the EU needs to re-
calibrate its policy to be more sensitive to the needs of  Belarusian society, rather 
than making it the object of  broader strategic rivalries.
Summary
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Ein doppeltes Spiel – Belarus zwischen 
Russland und der EU
von Alex Nice
Diese Analyse nimmt Belarus als den Fallgegenstand zur Untersuchung der Muster 
von Zusammenarbeit und Konflikt zwischen Russland und der EU innerhalb der 
»Gemeinsamen Nachbarschaft«. Untersuchungsgegenstand ist die Art und Weise, wie 
Belarus unter Alexander Lukashenko die Konkurrenz zwischen EU und Russland 
genutzt hat, um Vorteile zu erhalten, die den Fortbestand des Regimes gefördert haben.
Zu Anfang wird überprüft, warum die Beziehungen von Belarus mit Russland sich 
durch Zyklen von Konflikt und enger Bindung auszeichnen. Die Integration mit 
Belarus ist ein bedeutender Teil der russischen Bemühungen, die regionale Hege-
monie aufrechtzuerhalten. Andererseits wird die Beziehung auch als eine Last gese-
hen, die dem belarussischen Regime überlebenswichtige Ressourcen bringt, bei nur 
geringem Nutzen für Moskau. Die Widersprüche dieser Vorgehensweise sind durch 
die Zollunion noch verstärkt worden.
Es wird argumentiert, dass Belarus einen zusätzlichen Konflikt mit Russland dadurch 
provoziert hat, dass es Integration zunehmend instrumentell sieht. Die Bekräftigung 
einmal von Loyalität, dann wieder von Unabhängigkeit kann als eine Art von »Souve-
ränitätsunternehmertum« angesehen werden, die an den »ethnischen Kuhhandel« der 
russischen Regionen in den neunziger Jahren erinnert. Sobald sich Russland darum 
bemüht hat, Subventionen zu verringern, hat Belarus darauf  mit der Drohung geant-
wortet, seine Außenpolitik zu diversifizieren und sich andere Partner zu suchen.
Jedoch verdecken die Unbeständigkeiten von Lukashenkos Außenpolitik nur eine 
tiefer liegende Kontinuität – nämlich die Konsolidierung der belarussischen Staat-
lichkeit und der Identität als eines unabhängigen Staates. Für die EU – die ein 
Interesse an der Förderung der belarussischen Souveränität hat – liegt das Dilemma 
darin, dass sich dieser Prozess im Rahmen eines autoritären Staates abgespielt hat.
Sowohl die EU wie Russland bemühen sich darum, die innenpolitische Normen-
rahmen von Belarus zu formen. Die Folgerung der EU-Politik liegt darin, dass 
Belarus seine europäische Identität entdecken (oder wiedergewinnen) muss, die von 
seinem sowjetischen Erbe und dem gegenwärtigen Regime verschüttet worden ist. 
Die Begründung für die Integration mit Russland wiederum sind die gemeinsame 
Geschichte und die kulturellen Verwandtschaft als Teile eines einzigartigen slawi-
schen Zivilisationsraums.
Hinter diesen konkurrierenden Ansätzen verbirgt sich ein angedeuteter Kampf  um 
die belarussische Identität, die, da sie in Begriffen einer geopolitischen Entschei-
dung gebildet wird, zu einer Polarisierung zwischen Russland und der EU führen 
wird. Auf  längere Sicht wird die Festigung der belarussischen Staatlichkeit wahr-
scheinlich zu einer zusätzlichen Abgrenzung von Russland führen. Jedoch bedeutet 
der Misserfolg der nationalistischen Opposition, von der nachlassenden Unterstüt-
zung für das Lukaschenko-Regime zu profitieren, dass ein Regierungswechsel nicht 
notwendigerweise zu einer sofortigen »Europäisierung« von Belarus führen wird. 
Dies legt nahe, dass die EU ihre Politik neu ausrichten muss, um besser auf  die 
Bedürfnisse der belarussischen Gesellschaft eingehen zu können, anstatt sie zum 
bloßen Objekt breiterer strategischer Rivalitäten zu degradieren.
Zusammenfassung
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Introduction
This paper takes Belarus as a case study to consider 
the implications of  political competition between 
Russia and the EU in the “common neighbour-
hood.“ The primary focus is on the Belarus-Russia 
relationship, which has received less attention 
from analysts than EU policy towards Belarus, but 
plays a far more decisive and dynamic role in the 
country’s development. The paper examines the 
ways that Belarus under Alexander Lukashenko has 
exploited competition between the EU and Russia 
to extract subsidies which have helped to sustain 
the regime. 
Belarus is a small, authoritarian state with few 
mineral resources and an unreformed economy. 
It has depended heavily on subsidies from Rus-
sia to maintain growth without major economic 
liberalisation and deliver rents to the elite. To the 
extent that there is a Belarusian model of  eco-
nomic development, it relies on outsiders to pay for 
it. This approach could be understood as a form 
of  “sovereignty entrepreneurship,” through which 
Lukashenko has traded political loyalty, or threat-
ened geopolitical reorientation, in order to extract 
foreign support. The success of  this policy presup-
poses an atmosphere of  geopolitical competition 
between Russia and the West in which both sides 
seek to influence internal actors through a mixture 
of  coercion and inducements, and perceive the 
actions of  the other as illegitimate. The longevity 
of  the Lukashenko system, therefore, is in part a 
symptom of  the failure to build a normative con-
sensus between Russia and the West.
Both the EU and Russia are seeking to exercise 
external governance to shape Belarus’s domestic 
normative environment. Behind these competing 
approaches is an implied struggle for Belarusian 
identity which, because it is cast in terms of  geo-
political choice, is likely to lead to polarization 
between Russia and the EU should the country 
become politically unstable. The paper argues that 
this strategic rivalry between Russia and the EU 
leads both parties to pursue flawed policies towards 
the country and its leadership. As the regime in 
Belarus grows more brittle, the EU should be care-
ful not to assume that political change will be anal-
ogous with “Europeanization.” There is a danger 
that an atmosphere of  strategic competition could 
obscure the best policy choices for what should be 
its ultimate addressee: the Belarusian people. 
Belarus and Russia: Slavic Unity?
Russia and Belarus are notionally the closest of  
allies. Belarusian President Lukashenko’s rise to 
power in the mid-1990s was built around a rejection 
of  the pro-Western course of  nationalists led by the 
Belarusian Popular Front in favour of  economic 
and political re-integration with Russia. Following 
a series of  international agreements in the 1990s, 
Russia and Belarus ratified a treaty in January 2000 
establishing a Union State of  the two countries. 
This guaranteed equal labour rights in both coun-
tries, removed border controls, and was intended to 
lay the foundation for the unification of  legislation 
and creation of  a single economic space and single 
currency. In 2007 Belarus agreed to form a Cus-
toms Union with Russia and Kazakhstan, intended 
to create a free-trade area between the three coun-
tries and unify legislations and external tariffs. In 
integrating with Russia, Lukashenko presented 
Belarus as Russia’s bulwark against the West, on the 
front line of  a civilizational divide. In 1999 he stated 
that “[...] the Union of  Belarus and Russia should 
become an actual counterweight to the unipolar 
world that has currently developed [...] the strength-
Playing Both Sides: Belarus between Russia 
and the EU
by Alex Nice
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ening of  our unity is a historic chance of  the entire 
Slavic civilization to survive under the current grim 
conditions of  the world’s re-partition.”1
Russia and Belarus engage in close military coop-
eration through the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO) and on a bilateral level. The 
countries are part of  a unified regional air defense 
system and Russia possesses two strategic bases in 
Belarus: an early-warning radar installation system at 
Gantsevichi, and a military communication centre at 
Vileyka. In 2007 Lukashenko declared that: “We will 
always be with the Russian people. If  you would 
like to call us Russia’s outpost in the west, we do 
not mind, we have never denied that.”2 Most criti-
cally, Russia has long provided Belarus with exten-
sive economic support in the form of  subsidized 
oil and gas, cheap loans and favorable trade agree-
ments. These subsidies have played a significant 
contribution in maintaining the viability of  Belarus’ 
unreformed economy. According to President Dmi-
try Medvedev, total Russian subsidies to Belarus 
since 1991 have amounted to 50 billion Dollar.3
The Emergence of Conflict
In recent years, however, the relationship has 
become characterized by chronic conflict. A key 
area of  contention has been the price of  oil and 
gas supplied to Belarus as Russia has gradually 
sought to reduce the level of  subsidy it provides 
to its neighbor. In January 2004, Gazprom briefly 
stopped supplies of  gas to Belarus after the lat-
ter refused to agree to a price increase from 30 to 
50 Dollar per million cubic meters. Disputes over 
gas and oil prices arose also in 2007 and again in 
2010, when a conflict over gas prices and transit 
rates led Russia to reduce supplies by 15 per cent. 
The fall in subsidies has led to an increasingly 
confrontational stance from Minsk, which has 
publicly defied Russia on a number of  issues. Hav-
ing initially suggested that Belarus would follow 
Russia in recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
Lukashenko quickly dropped the initiative, claim-
ing that recognition could only be considered by 
the next parliament, although no formal procedure 
for the recognition of  new states exists in Belarus. 
In 2009 Lukashenko boycotted the Moscow sum-
mit of  the CSTO and cast doubt on the legitimacy 
of  the proposed Collective Rapid Reaction Force. 
When Vladimir Putin visited Brest in March 2010 
for a meeting of  the Union State, Lukashenko 
unexpectedly left for Venezuela. In early 2010 
Belarus initially refused to ratify the Code of  the 
Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan. 
Relations reached their lowest point to date in 
the second half  of  2010, when Russia launched 
an unprecedented “black PR” campaign against 
Lukashenko through a series of  documentaries on 
Russian television. On 3 October President Dmitry 
Medvedev publicly denounced Lukashenko’s anti-
Russian rhetoric in his video blog and implied he 
was responsible for high-profile disappearances in 
the early 2000s.4
The Cyclicality of Russia-Belarus 
Relations
These conflicts are in part a product of  broader 
shifts in Russia’s approach towards the near-abroad 
through which it has sought to put relations on a 
more commercial footing, whilst pushing to acquire 
control “strategic” industrial assets and pipelines.5 
In 2006, the Russian government announced its 
new policy of  achieving “equal profitability” from 
domestic, CIS and European gas sales by 2011, 
which presupposed a gradual rise in gas prices for 
all consumers to the levels paid in the EU. However, 
Russian foreign policy towards Belarus has not fol-
lowed a linear trajectory, but rather a cyclical pattern 
of  demands, tension and then retreat. At the end 
of  2006, for example, in line with its new energy 
policy, Russia moved to substantially raise the price 
of  gas and introduced an export duty on oil prod-
ucts of  180 Dollar per ton. On 10 January 2007, 
Belarus capitulated to the demands, yet two days 
later Russia unilaterally announced it was reducing 
the export duty to 53 Dollar per ton. Despite the 
dispute, Russia provided a 1.5 billion Dollar loan 
later that year in return for assurances that Belarus 
could host tactical missile weapons in response to 
the development of  infrastructure for a US missile 
defense shield in Eastern Europe. Similarly, despite 
the crisis in relations in 2010, at the start of  2011 
Belarus continued to enjoy relatively preferential 
natural gas imports and paid less than its neighbors. 
In May 2011, after lengthy negotiations, Russia pro-
vided a 3 billion Dollar loan to Belarus over three 
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years through the Eurasian Economic Community. 
According to the Russian Ministry of  Finance, sub-
sidies from oil and gas to Belarus in 2010 amounted 
to 4 billion Dollar.6 In November 2011, just a year 
after relations had reached their lowest point in the 
post-Soviet period, Russia and Belarus concluded 
new energy deals to reduce gas prices by 40 per 
cent until 2014 and increase the transit fee paid to 
Minsk. Following an agreement to sell the remain-
ing 50 percent of  shares in Beltransgaz to Gazprom 
for 2.5 billion Dollar, Russia’s Sberbank provided 
a 1 billion Dollar loan to the state-owned potash 
manufacturer Belruskalii.7
Blurred Boundaries
The cyclicality of  Russia-Belarus relations is due 
to the fact that Russia is caught between two con-
flicting policies: a desire to escape a relationship 
of  dependence, seen in efforts to reduce subsidies, 
and an abiding fear of  losing influence in a region 
of  “privileged interests.”8 As Hannes Adomeit 
argues, “Kremlin officials perceive policies in their 
near neighborhood as an extension of  Russian 
domestic ordering principles, as wedged between 
domestic politics and foreign policy.”9 This is par-
ticularly true in the case with Belarus because of  
the legacy of  integration projects between the two 
countries which blur distinctions between domestic 
and foreign policy. The Union State initiative of  
the 1990s for a time made Belarus a semi-endog-
enous factor in Russia’s domestic politics. After 
1996, Lukashenko started an active PR campaign 
in Russia positioning himself  as the unifier of  the 
Slavic peoples and visiting more than two-thirds of  
Russia’s regions. Belarus remains an internal factor 
in Russian politics. The Russian media campaign 
waged against Lukashenko in 2010 was intended 
largely for a domestic Russian audience to debunk 
the myth of  the Belarusian economic miracle, 
emphasize the corruption of  the regime, and its 
involvement with exiled oligarchs such as Boris 
Berezovsky. Despite a large number of  agreements 
on integration neither side was willing to carry the 
Union State integration project to any conclusion: 
Belarus because the local elite came to understand 
they could not protect their interests from the 
Kremlin within a single state, and Russia because 
a formal revision of  Russia’s borders could upset 
its fragile federal settlement and trigger another 
cascade of  ethnic-territorial bargaining within the 
country. Belarus thus continues to occupy a liminal 
space, somewhere between Russian foreign and 
domestic policy. 
This ambiguity allows both parties to move eas-
ily between different and often contradictory 
discourses to characterize the relationship. In the 
case of  Russia, it alternately frames its relationship 
with Belarus in terms of  fraternity, paternalism and 
parasitism.10 Even as Medvedev publicly attacked 
Lukashenko in his address in October 2010, for 
example, he continued to underline the importance 
of  fraternal relations with Belarus, and claimed 
Russians and Belarusians are a single people. The 
blurring of  political and cultural boundaries ampli-
fies Russian sensitivities to western engagement. 
The logic of  the Union State implies the exis-
tence—or, at least desirability—of  a broader politi-
cal community based around a slavic civilizational 
bloc. The potential for political change in the coun-
try is thus perceived not simply as a foreign policy 
problem, but as a direct threat to domestic interests.
Sovereignty Entrepreneurship
Over the years, the Belarusian leadership has 
proven adept at manipulating the ambiguity in its 
relationship with Russia and playing on the contra-
dictions in Russia’s foreign policy. Belarus’s policy 
could be characterized as “sovereignty entrepre-
neurship”—the extraction of  rents in the form of  
energy subsidies and credits in return for loyalty, 
or through the threat of  a reorientation away from 
Russia. Belarus’s response to falling Russian sub-
sidies has been to threaten to diversify its foreign 
policy options, including with the EU, and empha-
size its independence. In 2006, in response to Rus-
sian plans to raise gas prices, Lukashenko claimed 
that: “Our strategic line to the European Union is 
clear. We are saying frankly: without intending to 
join the EU, we offer a mutually beneficial partner-
ship with this strong neighbor […] Belarus is not 
an enemy of  the EU, she is their partner. We are 
ready to cooperate.”11 The policy is not so much 
“neo-titoist,”12 as reminiscent of  the ethnic bargain-
ing techniques of  Russia’s regions in the Yeltsin 
period. This strategy has conditioned some of  the 
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key features of  Belarus’ foreign policy, include 
striking rhetorical inconsistency, an indifference 
to external opinion, apparently reckless brinkman-
ship, and above all a tendency to reduce all foreign 
relations to transactional bargaining, whilst playing 
heavily on ideational factors and identity politics. 
Thus whilst Belarusian officials have recently talked 
up the benefits of  the Customs Union and the 
Single Economic Space, they took a whole year to 
haggle over each provision and have made Belaru-
sian participation conditional on the maintenance 
of  energy subsidies. 
Lukashenko has long understood the principle that 
“in bargaining, weakness may be strength”13 and 
has finessed the art of  revising or ignoring interna-
tional agreements. For example, the January 2004 
energy conflict with Russia was in part a response to 
Lukashenko’s failure to honor a deal to sell control-
ling stakes in 30 Belarusian companies in exchange 
for the Kremlin’s recognition of  the 2001 presiden-
tial election.14 When Belarus signed a new deal on 
oil import prices on 27 January 2010, the Deputy 
Prime Minister observed that “the agreement as 
we sign today cannot last long.”15 Conflict does not 
mark a failure of  policy in this context—it is part 
of  the fabric Belarus’ foreign policy, since regional 
stability itself  is used as a bargaining chip in negotia-
tions. The same transactional logic shapes the nego-
tiations with the EU over the release of  political 
prisoners, and Belarus’s abrupt announcement that 
it was halting an agreement with the US to transfer 
stocks of  nuclear material to Russia in August 2011. 
The instrumentalization of  ideational factors fits 
into the logic of  personalized rule and informal 
systems of  power which predominate on both 
sides. The Belarus-Russia relationship is dogged by 
corruption. One of  the most important forms of  
subsidy to Belarus has been the supply of  Russian 
oil free of  export-tariffs. The Belarusian state has 
depended heavily on this, using the profits from the 
re-export of  oil at world prices to cross-subsidize 
loss-making firms. The arrangement provides fertile 
ground for corruption since Belarus has essentially 
operated as an off-shore intermediary for Rus-
sian oil companies. It has been suggested that the 
unilateral decision by Russia in 2007 to cut export 
tariffs to 53 Dollar per ton two days after demand-
ing 180 Dollar per ton was the product of  such 
corrupt agreements.16 Russian beneficiaries of  the 
Belarusian off-shore include Surgutneftegaz, Ros-
neft, Gazpromneft, Lukoil, Slavneft and RussNeft.17 
As in Ukraine, the lack of  transparency in energy 
arrangements further blurs the distinction between 
domestic and foreign, because it brings part of  the 
Russian and Belarusian elite into a corrupt trans-
national network inclined to privilege corporate 
interests over national priorities. Thus Yaroslav 
Romanchuk described the oligarchs who profited 
from Russia’s energy concessions to Belarus as “the 
first citizens of  the Union State.”18 A fruitful way 
of  conceptualizing the relationship is to view the 
Belarusian elite as occupying an outer branch of  
what Alena Ledeneva calls “sistema”: the web of  
informal elite networks which bind actors in a logic 
of  mutual dependence and responsibility (krugovaya 
poruka).19 Such a system is inherently unstable, since 
the rules of  the game are fluid and obscure, but it 
is also very difficult to escape from. Lukashenko 
is also careful to remain personally involved in all 
intergovernmental agreements. This has not only 
made him one of  the main beneficiaries, but also 
positions him as a guarantor of  the relationship, 
strengthening his position in relation to both Russia 
and the domestic Belarusian elite.
Belarus and the EU
Since the mid-1990s, Belarus’ relations with the 
EU have moved through phases of  conflict and 
engagement, whilst remaining fundamentally 
antagonistic. The EU’s policy towards Belarus has 
been shaped by three main considerations: a desire 
to strengthen Belarusian independence vis-à-vis 
Russia; the need, particularly after the 2004 EU 
enlargement, to have a functional relationship with 
a direct neighbor; and a normative agenda which 
emphasizes human rights and liberalization of  the 
Belarusian political system. The problem the EU 
faces is that these policy strands are not mutually 
compatible in the context of  a political regime in 
Minsk which perceives EU external governance 
not only as undesirable, but as a direct threat to its 
existence. 
Since 1997, when ratification of  a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement was suspended because 
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of  growing authoritarianism in the country, the 
EU has effectively placed itself  in opposition to 
the Belarusian regime. In 2004, the EU set its 
policy towards Belarus within a clear framework of  
conditionality. The Eastern Neighbourhood Policy 
Strategy document stated that “if  significant posi-
tive developments take place in democratization 
in Belarus, there is scope for more active engage-
ment with the Belarusian authorities at political 
level.”20 Over time the definition of  what might 
constitute significant positive development has 
shifted. The 2006 “Non-Paper on Belarus” set out 
a list of  12 steps required for the establishment 
of  a full partnership. The paper was addressed to 
the people of  Belarus, rather than the government, 
underlining the perceived illegitimacy of  the leader-
ship. Demanding full implementation of  the paper 
was tantamount to seeking regime change, since it 
would require a complete overhaul of  the political 
and economic structure of  the country.
The inclusion of  Belarus in the Eastern Partner-
ship initiative, and the increase in dialogue follow-
ing the Russian-Georgian War appeared to indicate 
a shift to a more pragmatic approach. The impera-
tives for the EU to act as a “normative power” 
were apparently balanced by more realist consider-
ations emphasizing the importance of  maintaining 
Belarusian sovereignty and the need for pragmatic 
engagement. This has been led in particular by 
Belarus’ direct EU neighbors, which have been 
concerned to maintain Belarusian sovereignty as a 
bulwark against Russian influence. In 2011, Dalia 
Grybauskaite, President of  Lithuania, described 
Lukashenko as “a guarantee of  stability in Belarus, 
and assurance that Russia will not be in this coun-
try on the border with Lithuania.”21 In practice, 
however, the Eastern Partnership has retained an 
embedded conditionality in its approach that belies 
the notion of  partnership and joint ownership 
which the policy claims to advocate.22 On the eve 
of  the December 2010 Presidential elections, it was 
suggested that the government could receive 3 bil-
lion Dollar in financial support should the election 
meet OSCE standards.
The crackdown on the opposition following the 
2010 Presidential elections has pushed the EU into 
a new round of  sanctions and travel bans against 
leading officials. Following the elections the foreign 
ministers of  Sweden, the Czech Republic, Poland 
and Germany made perhaps the most explicit call 
for the removal of  Lukashenko to date in an article 
in the New York Times.23 The on-going repression 
in Belarus has led to a diplomatic impasse, with 
high-level interaction between Belarus and the EU 
almost entirely frozen. At the same time, the EU 
has put placed a renewed emphasis on democracy 
promotion in the country, with a donor conference 
in February 2011 raising 87 million Euros in aid to 
support the NGO sector and independent media. 
At the conference, Polish Prime Minister Radek 
Sikorski drew an explicit parallel between the 
overthrow of  Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni 
Mubarak, and the Lukashenko regime.24
The EU’s policy towards Belarus is typically seen 
within the context of  a tension between an ideal-
ist approach, which privileges democracy promo-
tion, and realist concerns over the need to support 
Belarusian statehood for the sake of  broader strate-
gic aims.25 In practice, however, both isolation and 
engagement have been pursued to a common end: 
to exert external influence on Belarus’ develop-
ment, either through diplomatic coercion, socializa-
tion of  elites, or support of  alternative domestic 
players. Whilst the EU imagines itself  as a peaceful, 
benign norm-diffuser in the region, its rhetoric 
and policies have often positioned it in direct con-
frontation with Lukashenko and the regime more 
broadly. As one analyst observed in 2005, “EU 
policy has sought regime change by declaration.”26 
Lukashenko has used the threat of  Western-spon-
sored regime change as a means to consolidate his 
position amongst the elite, and extract rents from 
Russia. As he stated in response to the introduc-
tion of  the US Democracy Act in 2004, “If  you 
scold me for seeing internal and external enemies, 
why are you giving me a pretext for finding such 
an enemy outside the country? Why are you sup-
plying me with such a chance?”27 For Russia, which 
perceives international relations largely in a zero-
sum context, democracy promotion in its sphere of  
“privileged interests” is reflexively seen as an instru-
ment of  western power politics. When US Secre-
tary of  State Condoleezza Rice called for political 
change in 2005, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei 
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Lavrov was quick to offer support to Lukashenko: 
“We would not of  course be advocating what some 
people call regime changes anywhere. We think 
the democratic process, the process of  reform 
cannot be imposed from outside.”28 References to 
the primacy of  state sovereignty and the threat of  
foreign interference have coloured Russian political 
discourse for many years. Following the launch of  
the Eastern Partnership, Lavrov accused the EU of  
seeking to extend its sphere of  influence, including 
into Belarus.29
From Sovereign Bureaucracy to 
Sovereign State
The EU’s policy has thus inadvertently provided an 
opportunity for Lukashenko to blackmail Russia 
through threats of  Western encroachment. Cycles 
of  conflict and engagement are built into the fab-
ric of  Belarus’ relationship with both Russia and 
the EU, and the regime has successfully exploited 
geopolitical competition in the post-Soviet space 
to extract foreign policy rents. The promiscuity of  
Lukashenko’s foreign policy is in part a product 
of  the undemocratic environment in which it is 
formulated, allowing the elite to pursue policies of  
convenience, without deference to broader societal 
trends.
However, the apparent inconsistencies in Belaru-
sian foreign policy obscure an important internal 
dynamic. Behind the games of  “virtual integration” 
with Russia, the regime has pursued a state-building 
policy, which, whilst based on very different foun-
dational myths to that of  the nationalist opposition, 
has nevertheless emphasized Belarusian indepen-
dence, and created room for the development of  
a distinct Belarusian identity. In the 20 years since 
the collapse of  the USSR the reality of  Belarusian 
statehood has gradually filled with ideological con-
tent. This has above all involved differentiation 
from Moscow. As the Russian analyst Sergei Kara-
ganov observed in 2007: “In more than a decade, 
there has emerged a Belarusian political class which 
no longer wants rapprochement with Moscow.”30 
In part this is simply a natural product of  the decay 
of  the post-Soviet space, through which the popu-
lations and elites of  the newly independent states 
have acquired what Arkady Moshes calls the “habit 
of  independence.”31 Belarus was long thought to 
be an outlier in this process. Lukashenko, after 
all, came to power on a platform of  reintegration 
with Russia in opposition to the nationalist agenda. 
However, since the start of  Putin’s presidency in 
2000 Lukashenko has understood that he could 
only build a sovereign bureaucracy within a sov-
ereign state. As a result, as Natalia Leschenko has 
argued, far from being a “denationalized” nation, 
Belarus has been the site of  a comprehensive 
nation-building project.32
Whilst continuing to pay lip-service to notions of  
Slavic kinship, the regime in Minsk has promoted 
a nation-building project which increasingly differ-
entiates Belarus from Russia. Despite the notional 
commitment to economic integration through 
the Union State and now Customs Union, Rus-
sian investment in Belarus is viewed as a threat 
in Minsk and has been securitized by the elite. In 
recent years a number of  “show trials” of  public 
officials accused of  lobbying Russian oligarchic 
interests have been held in Belarus. There has been 
no equivalent clampdown on officials working with 
European investors.33 Belarus’s response to Mos-
cow’s pressure for economic liberalization reveals 
much about its attitude to Russia. There appears 
to be a broad consensus across much of  the ruling 
elite that Russian acquisition of  assets would mark 
an unacceptable surrender of  sovereignty. Follow-
ing Aleksei Kudrin’s remarks in early 2011 on the 
weakness of  the Belarusian economy and the need 
for reform, Lukashenko remarked “they don’t just 
want to privatize these enterprises (not even priva-
tize—take over them for nothing)—they want to 
privatize the whole country […] be in no doubt, 
there is a serious game afoot. If  we resist the state 
will continue to exist. If  we don’t resist, they will 
crush us and put us in their pocket.”34
By presenting the current state-dominated own-
ership structure as an issue of  national survival, 
Lukashenko is able to legitimize an economic and 
political structure which keeps him in power. In his 
speeches, Lukashenko frequently contrasts the sta-
bility, equality and social harmony of  Belarus with 
Russia’s “oligarchic capitalism.” This is also a com-
mon theme of  his meetings with representatives of  
the provincial Russian media. In 2008, as Lukash-
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enko sought to engage with the West, he stated 
that: “We have declared in full voice that we are a 
nation, that we are sovereign, that we are indepen-
dent. Of  course many do not like this. Especially 
those who consider Belarus, Ukraine and other 
countries its ‘zone of  special interests.’”35 The 
diversification of  Belarusian foreign policy which 
has taken place over the last few years, which has 
led to intensified links with countries such as Iran, 
Venezuela and China, is in part an effort to locate 
new sources of  investment, but is also intended to 
underline the country’s political and strategic inde-
pendence from its neighbor.
Lukashenko’s chameleon foreign policy has been 
in part dictated by expediency, but it also reflects 
broader popular ambivalence about the country’s 
geopolitical orientation. This is underlined by the 
singular failure of  the opposition to mobilize mass 
support around identity issues. National opinion 
polls show that Belarusians feel an affinity for both 
Russia and the EU, and support for integration 
with both sides at the same time. In 2010, even 
amongst those who planned to vote for an oppo-
sition candidate, 42 per cent favored a candidate 
who would improve relations with Europe and 
Russia in equal measure.36 Unpalatable as it is to 
admit for many Western observers, Lukashenko’s 
brand of  identity politics—which places empha-
sis on statehood over nationalism combined with 
reverence for the Soviet heritage and a nod to 
Slavic brotherhood—has for the moment proven 
more in tune with the attitudes of  the majority of  
the population than that of  the opposition which 
emphasize Belarus’ European roots and seek to 
build a national identity for the country around its 
medieval history as a part of  the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth.
A Civilizational Choice Deferred—
or Imagined?
Understanding the development of  Belarusian 
national identity is important, because identity poli-
tics shapes both the EU and Russia’s approach to 
the country. Behind much of  the discourse in the 
EU and Russia is an assumption that the future 
of  Belarus as an independent country involves 
a civilizational choice to identify either with an 
East-Slavic “Russian World,” or as a European 
country which will ultimately align with EU norms 
and governance structures. Seen from Minsk, the 
EU and Russia’s policies towards Belarus are less 
different that they might first appear. Both have 
employed a mixture of  incentives and coercion to 
try to influence internal policy and exercise external 
governance. Both are strongly conditioned by ide-
ational and normative factors which in part reflect 
a projection of  domestic priorities. 
For the EU, Belarus is a target for democracy pro-
motion and external governance—it is viewed as a 
country which needs to be changed through liberal-
ization of  the political system and engagement with 
society. The liberal change is assumed to involve 
a greater identification with EU norms—indeed 
the acceptance of  the EU’s external governance is 
seen as synonymous with Europeanization. As a 
result, there is a tendency to imagine the Belarusian 
people as a self-evidently “pro-European” nation 
held hostage by a neo-Soviet elite. As the opposi-
tion politician Alexander Milinkevich remarked of  
Lukashenko in 2006, “I am a Belarusian, and he is a 
Soviet man.”37 Such an approach ignores the active 
nation-building policies which have taken place 
under Lukashenko, which has positioned Belarus 
as an undeniably European country, but rejects the 
imposition of  EU governance. Thus the propo-
nents of  Belarus’s European identity actually seek 
the reformatting of  the Belarusian nation that has 
been shaped in a very different normative context.
The fact that the consolidation of  Belarusian state-
hood has been driven by an authoritarian leadership 
which positions itself  in opposition to European 
values is one of  the fundamental challenges facing 
the nationalist opposition and the EU. The success 
of  the EU’s policy in Eastern Europe has rested 
on the assumption that in target countries the 
dynamics of  nationalization, democratization and 
Europeanization are necessarily aligned. In Belarus, 
however, the dominant nation-building process 
has been pursued without democratization, and 
in opposition to European integration. As Nelly 
Bekus argues, the assumption that democratization 
is synonymous with a “national revival” weakens 
the democratic agenda by hitching it to the divisive 
issue of  identity politics.38
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Alternative Approaches to Belarus
Belarus’ geopolitical ambivalence therefore reflects 
not only Lukashenko’s opportunism but deeper his-
torical and cultural legacies. The EU needs to bear 
this in mind as it seeks to foster political change 
in the country. A “European choice” for Belarus 
should never be foreclosed, but current policies risk 
privileging divisive identity issues over pragmatic 
concerns and pushing the EU into supporting 
opposition groups which do not reflect the interests 
of  broader society. To date, the decline in support 
for Lukashenko has not been accompanied by a 
commensurate gain in popularity for any other polit-
ical force.39 The opposition remains unknown to the 
broader population, civil society is undeveloped and 
horizontal linkages are weak. This is not to suggest 
that the failure of  the opposition should be placed 
on the EU, or indeed on exclusively on opposition 
activists. Operating any kind of  grassroots campaign 
in the context of  a police-state is extremely difficult.
At a time of  economic crisis in Europe, the EU 
should avoid taking the gravitational attraction of  
the EU’s social and political model for granted. 
In order to construct a successful policy towards 
Belarus, the EU needs to move beyond the teleol-
ogy of  “transition” to European norms and recog-
nize the specificity of  the country’s development. 
The Belarusian economy is under serious pres-
sure, and there is an increasing risk of  instability. 
The Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004/2005, 
underlined the potential for instability to lead to 
polarization when the common neighborhood is 
inscribed with sweeping geopolitical narratives. The 
fact that Lukashenko is an autocrat does not dimin-
ish the fact that he reflects the cultural values of  
a significant proportion of  the population. Rather 
than focusing on the “Europeanization” of  Belarus, 
a more fruitful approach would be to side-step 
identity politics and engage with more practical 
issues. If  the EU is to act as “post-modern power” 
it should not allow strategic rivalry with Russia to 
obscure the interests of  the Belarusian people. 
The greatest policy priority for Belarus at the 
moment is the development of  a coherent plan for 
economic development and modernization. Aver-
age wages, which were raised in advance of  the 
presidential elections to 500 Dollar per month, fell 
to 265 Dollar in September 2011 as a result of  a 
series of  currency devaluations and spiralling infla-
tion. In 2011 Belarus fell from the third best to the 
third worst country in the CIS in terms of  average 
salary, above only Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The 
decline of  the Lukashenko regime is likely to be 
accompanied by a period of  painful economic 
adjustment. In 2011, the number of  people below 
the poverty line increased by 2.5 times to a quar-
ter of  the population.40 Given the weakness of  
the opposition and the size and strength of  the 
bureaucracy, agents of  change are most likely to 
come from within the regime. A number of  ana-
lysts have thus advocated attempting to build ties 
with reform-minded members of  the ruling elite 
as a means to of  overcoming the impasse in EU-
Belarus relations.41 Whilst Lukashenko continues to 
hold political prisoners, such an approach remains 
politically and morally impossible. If, however, 
Russia seeks to exploit Belarus’ economic crisis to 
push for greater control of  the economy, Lukash-
enko may once again seek to engage with the EU, 
at which point new policy options may become 
available.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that the strategic rivalry 
between the EU and Russia has generated a propi-
tious environment in which Belarusian authori-
tarianism can survive. Russian strategic culture 
continues to perceive its near abroad in zero-sum 
terms. Russian officials often warn that advanc-
ing Euro-Atlantic integration in the post-Soviet 
space will create “new dividing lines” in Europe.42 
Lukashenko has proven adept at manipulating per-
ceived cultural, normative, and institutional bound-
aries between Russia and the West to his advantage. 
The various integration projects between Russia 
and Belarus have blurred political, ethnic and cul-
tural boundaries without providing any roadmap 
for the creation of  a coherent political commu-
nity. This institutionalized ambiguity has allowed 
Lukashenko to play at “virtual integration” when it 
has suited him, whilst consolidating sovereignty of  
the Belarusian political system. Such ambiguity is 
harmful to the political culture of  both countries. A 
political community needs clearly defined borders 
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to build a civic identity; whilst the border of  Rus-
sia and Belarus remains blurred by transcendental 
civilizational categories, autocratic rule is likely to 
persist in both countries. Behind the question of  
Belarusian sovereignty thus looms the unresolved 
contradictions in Russia’s own national identity and 
state-building project.
The success of  Belarusian foreign policy has rested 
on a deep-seated conviction in Moscow that an 
expansion of  Western influence in the neighbor-
hood represents an existential risk to Russia. As 
a result, Moscow has continued to subsidize the 
Lukashenko regime despite chronic disputes. 
Escaping this dynamic will be impossible without 
fundamental shifts in foreign policy in Russia. Nev-
ertheless, the EU could profitably seek to interro-
gate the foundations of  this strategic competition. 
As Igor Torbakov notes, Russia’s foreign policy is 
schizophrenic, simultaneously proclaiming strategic 
independence and seeking rapprochement with the 
West.43 In its dialogue with Russia, the EU could 
challenge Moscow to unpick some of  these contra-
dictions, and make clear that a true strategic part-
nership between Russia and the West can only be 
achieved on the basis of  the promotion of  shared 
values in the neighborhood. 
At the same time, the EU needs also to ensure 
that it does not become hostage to identity issues 
in its approach to Belarus. Like Russia, the EU is 
seeking to be a normative hegemon in its neigh-
borhood. The EU’s power to shape its normative 
environment through policies such as the Eastern 
Partnership rests on its soft power and perceived 
legitimacy amongst the citizens and elites of  target 
states. By tying democratization to divisive identity 
politics, however, the EU risks undermining its 
normative legitimacy. The challenge for the EU is 
to promote a universalist agenda of  human rights 
within an environment in which they are quickly 
interpreted in terms of  particularistic geopolitical 
interests.
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